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The Innkeeper's Lien and Due Process-Klim v. Jones
The problems associated with human mobility require constant testing
and refining of the principles embodied in our common and statutory law.
Furthermore, there has developed an increasing concern for the rights of
the economically disadvantaged individual in contemporary America.'
The compound problems of the mobile poor have been partly resolved by
the application of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to them.2
An example of this trend of individual constitutional protection in a
mobile society occurs in Klim v. Jones,3 where the court held that taking
possession of a traveler's possessions under a statutory innkeeper's lien
denied him due process of law. In Klim the manager of a hotel approached
the plaintiff and requested payment. When the plaintiff denied owing any-
thing the manager locked him out of his room, denying him access to
papers and equipment necessary to his employment.4 The court held the
lien unconstitutional because it failed to provide for a hearing before the
manager could deprive the plaintiff of his property.'
Even though the innkeeper's lien had its beginning under Roman law'
where an absolute duty was imposed upon the innkeeper to insure the
safety of the property of his guest,' the common law innkeeper's lien arose
I See, e.g., Comment, Due Process and the Right to a Prior Hearing in Welfare
Cases, 37 FoROHAM L. REV. 604 (1969); Note, Public Landlords and Private Tenants:
The Eviction of "Undesirables From Public Housing Projects, 77 YAr L.J. 988
(1968).
2 See, e.g., Comment, The Constitutional Minhnum for the Termination of Welfare
Benefits: The Need for and Requirements of a Prior Hearing, 68 Micr. L. REv. 112
(1969); Note, Public Landlords and Private Tenants: The Eviction of "Undesirables"
From Public Housing Projects, 77 YALE L.J. 988 (1968); Note, Withdrawal of Public
Welfare: The Right to a Prior Hearing, 76 YAE L.J. 1234 (1967).
3315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
4 The plaintiff, a painter, worked irregularly and was of limited financial means.
Everything he owned was locked inside the room. His tools, driver's license, birth
certficate, and bank book were among the items detained. Id. at 111.
5 The court stated as follows:
• .. [T]his court grants plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and declares
California Civil Code § 1861 unconstitutional insofar as it fails to provide for a
hearing prior to the imposition of the lien pursuant thereto. Id. at 124.
6For the historical development of innkeepers dating from the Roman era, see
W. HALE, Tim LAW or BAILMENTS AND CAruumRs 254 n.1 (1896).
7 See Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 119, n.112 (N.D. Cal. 1970), citing N. COUR-
NOYER, INTRODUcnON TO HOTEL AND RESTAURANT LAW 7 (1968).
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in Medieval England.8 The innkeeper was under a duty to take in travelers
who might come to his door.9 Since the guest, who was usually unfamiliar
with the area, had to give custody of his property to a servant or host
who was a stranger to him," the innkeeper had the absolute duty of pre-
venting loss and injury to the guest's property." Because of this responsi-
bility, an innkeeper acquired a lien upon the property received by him in
his capacity as an innkeeper for the reasonable value of the services
rendered to the guest." The lien did not confer a right of sale, but only
a right to hold the property until the guest made quantum meruit pay-
ment." The lien attached as soon as the property was brought on the
premises and remained thereon even if the guest wrongfully removed
it.'" Today this lien exists by statute in most states.15
In Klim, the lien was attacked because it did not afford the guest a
hearing prior to its imposition. The guest was on notice that his property
would be held until payment. Fair notice and the opportunity to be heard
8 See M. DOBIE, LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS 5 90, at 241 (1914); R. BROWN, THE
LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 102, at 482 (2d ed. 1955). A large amount of traveling de-
veloped in England during that time. There were many dangers and hazards en-
countered by travelers. Roads were very often bad and there were also highwaymen
and outlaws with which to contend. It was therefore imperative that the traveler seek
shelter and safety along the way both for himself and his property. These dangers
were considerably greater at night. See Navagh, A New Look at the Liability of Inn
Keepers for Guest Property Under New York Law, 25 FomiDAw L. REv. 62, 63 (1956).
9 See 1 L. JoNEs, A TREAISE ON THE LAW OF LIENS § 498, at 499 (3d ed. 1914);
W. HALE, supra note 6, § 53, at 274-75; 40 AM. JUR. 2d Hotels, Motels, etc. SS 62-3
(1968).
10 See Navagh, supra note 8, at 63.
11Id. There are exceptions to this rule, however. The innkeeper was not liable
where loss occurred by accidental fire, by an act of God or the public enemy, by
reason of the inherent nature of the property, and where it was the fault of the
guest, or his servant or companion. W. HALE, supra note 6, § 54, at 277; R. BROWN,
supra note 8, § 102, at 483; 40 AM. JUR. 2d Hotels, Motels, etc. S 126 (1968).
12In return for the obligation imposed upon the innkeeper he is invested with a
lien. The most noteworthy characteristic of the lien is that it is not confined to
property owned by the guest, but attaches to all property brought with him and in
good faith received by the innkeeper as the guest's property. See 1 L. JoNEs, supra
note 9, 5 498, at 449; accord, R. BROWN, supra note 8 § 114, at 548; M. DoBiE, supra
note 8, 5100, at 285; 40 AM. JUR. 2d Hotels, Motels, etc. § 187 (1968).
13See 1 L. JONES, supra note 9, § 525, at 483; 40 Am. JuR. 2d Hotels, Motels, etc.
§ 191 (1968). A remedy of sale after a certain period is generally provided by statute.
See 1. L. JoNES, supra note 9, § 525, at 483.
14 See 40 AM. JuR. 2d Hotels, Motels, etc. § 189 (1968).
15 At common law the lien was limited strictly to the innkeepers. See 1 L. JoNES,
supra note 9, § 515, at 462; 40 AM. JUR. 2d Hotels, Motels, etc. § 186 (1968). See, e.g.,
VA. CODE ANN. §5 43-31, 43-34- to -40 (1950).
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are the two essential elements of procedural due process."6 The test applied
in the past to determine whether procedural due process has been violated
is the traditional "balancing test" wherein public and private interests are
weighed." The Klim court, following the line of reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,8 concen-
trated its argument on the disastrous effects of the innkeeper's lien upon
the individual to whom it was applied. 9 The court felt that no special or
16The United States Supreme Court has relied on this principle as early as 1863.
See Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 223 (1863):
Common justice requires that no man shall be condemned in his person or
property without notice and an opportunity to make his defence. Id. at 233.
In several other decisions since this one, the Court has held these two requirements to
be fundamental characteristics of procedural due process. See, e.g., Anderson Nat'l Bank
v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944):
The fundamental requirement of due process is an opportunity to be heard upon
such notice and proceedings as are adequate to safeguard the right for which
the constitutional protection is invoked. Id. at 246.
Accord, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp,
395 U.S. 337 (1969); Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334 (1963); Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
1TSee, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), where the court remarked:
The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is
influenced by the extent to which he may be "condemned to suffer grevious
loss" ... and depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that loss
outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication. Id. at 262-63;
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961):
... [C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given
set of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the
governmental function involved as well as of the private interest that has been
affected by the governmental action. Id. at 895;
Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959):
Application of the broad restraints of due process compels inquiry into the nature
of the demand being made upon the individual freedom in a particular context
and the justification of social need in which the demand rests. Id. at 363;
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951):
The precise nature of the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner
in which this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to the
procedure that was followed . . . , the balance of hurt complained of and the
good accomplished-these are some of the considerations that must enter into the
judicial judgment. Id. at 163 (concurring opinion, Frankfurter, J.).
18 395 U.S. 337 (1969), noted in 68 MicH. L. REv. 986 (1970); 64 Nw. UL. REv. 750
(1969); 22 VAND. L. REV. 1400 (1969). This case involved a Wisconsin pre-judgment
wage garnishment statute which did not afford an evidentiary hearing prior to the
retention of a debtor's wages by his employer, the garnishee. The court held that
such deprivation of a person's wages was in violation of the principles of due process
and therefore unconstitutional. 395 U.S. at 342. The court weighed only the individual's
interest in finding that procedural due process was violated.
19 315 F. Supp. at 122-24. What the Klirn court, is actually saying is that the inn-
keeper's lien statute, California Civil Code § 1861, is procedurally defective because it
substantively had or could have a disastrous effect upon the plaintiff.
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overriding state or creditor interest warranted existence of the lien with-
out procedural guarantees.2 The Sniadach decision was primarily con-
cerned with the individual's interest with respect to a pre-judgment wage
garnishment statute and did not even consider the needs of the creditor.'
The Klim court reasoned that the greatest practical impact of the lien was
upon such persons as the plaintiff, who were of limited financial means.2
It also cautioned that, as in the principal case, property detained under
the lien might be needed by the guest to carry on a livelihood until trial
of the issues.23 Furthermore, there was the possibility of economic coercion,
because the innkeeper could detain the guest's property on the basis of
dubious, or even fraudulent claims.24
In attempting to reconcile the requisites of procedural due process with
those procedures used in pre-judgment attachment, courts have argued
that such a detention of a person's property is merely deprivation of the
possession or use, and not a defeasance of the title.25 It has also been sug-
20 Id. at 124.
21 See note 18 supra.
22 315 F. Supp. at 122.
23 Id. at 123.
24 ld.
2 5 See Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 163 S.E. 845 (1932), citing McInnes v.
McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), as follows:
If, after having full opportunity to be heard in defense of such claim, a judgment
is rendered thereon against the defendant or his property, there has been no lack
of due process. In the meantime there has been no deprivation of property. The
attachment, quasi in re-m in nature, has operated only to detain the property
temporarily, to await final judgment on the merits of plaintiff's claim. 112 W. Va.
at 198, 163 S.E. at 848.
But see Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328
U.S. 256 (1946).
Since 1897 only five decisions have been handed down involving the constitutionality
of the innkeeper's lien. See Brown Shoe Co. v. Hunt, 103 Iowa 586, 72 N.W. 765
(1897). The innkeeper held the salesman's samples as security for the accommodations
furnished and the court held that such was not a deprivation of property without due
process. See McClain v. Williams, 11 S.D. 227, 76 N.W. 930 (1898). The court felt it
was unconstitutional to give an innkeeper a lien over goods of a third person not a
guest, but which were brought upon the premises by the guest. But see note 12 supra.
The court implied, however, that it was not a violation of due process to impose a
lien upon the guest's own property. See Nance v. Houck Piano Co., 128 Tenn. 1, 155
S.W. 1172 (1913). The court stated:
Hotels and boarding houses are public necessities, and the Legislature may give
them such reasonable protection as, in its judgment, a sound public policy may
demand. If the Legislature believed that keepers of hotels and boarding houses
are exposed to fraud and deceit by a fraudulent show of baggage in possession of
their guests and patrons, and apparently belonging to them, it is competent for
it to provide a lien in their favor for the accommodations received from them
[Vol. 5:392
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gested that since the withdrawal of the owner's right to possession is only
temporary, it does not violate his procedural due process.2" If the owner
loses in court, his due process has not been violated, and if he wins, he
has only lost possession temporarily, while retaining title the whole time.
These arguments did not survive the reasoning in Sniadach"2 when ap-
upon the strength and credit extended .... Id. at 2, 155 S.W. at 1173.
See Van Laar v. Marchesini 107 Misc. 186, 175 N.Y.S. 456 (1919). The court upheld the
lien of the innkeeper to be constitutional but found that due process was violated in
giving a boarding house keeper a lien on the goods of a third person brought upon the
premises by the guest. Only the innkeeper had a lien at common law. See Lines Music
Co. v. Holt, 332 Mo. 749, 60 S.W.2d 32 (1933), noted in 22 GEo. L.J. 101 (1933), the
most recent case before Klim to decide the question of the constitutionality of the
innkeeper's lien. The court held that a Missouri statute declarative of the common law
innkeeper's lien was not unconstitutional since it did not violate due process of law.
26McInnes v. McKay, 127 Me. 110, 141 A. 699 (1928), aff'd per curian, 279 U.S.
820 (1928). This case's validity as to general attachment is questionable though as
Justice Douglas stated in the majority opinion of Sniadacb:
A procedural rule that may satisfy due process for attachments in general, see
McKay v. Mclnnes, 279 U.S. 820, does not necessarily satisfy procedural due
process in every case. 395 U.S. at 340.
However, Justice Harlan was unwilling to admit that McKay met the essentials of
due process. See 395 U.S. at 343 (concurring opinion).
.27The Sniadacb court cited cases where such summary procedure would meet the
requirements of due process in certain extraordinary situations. See Ewing v.
Mytinger & Casselberry Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950). The seizure of misbranded articles
under § 304(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was allowed without a
prior hearing.
In another case a conservator was appointed to take possession of a federal savings
and loan association prior to a statutory hearing. The court upheld this summary
procedure. See Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947).
In the third exception mentioned by Sniadach, which involved the pre-judgment
attachment of the property of stockholders in an insolvent bank, the Court said:
As to the lien, nothing is more common than to allow parties alleging themselves
to be creditors to establish in advance by attachment a lien dependent for its
effect upon the result of the suit. Coffin Bros. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29, 31 (1928).
The fourth exception involved the pre-judgment attachment of the property of an
out of state defendant. See Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921):
... [A] property owner who absents himself from the territorial jurisdiction of
a State, leaving his property within it, must be deemed ex necessitate to consent
that the State may subject such property to judicial process to answer demands
made against him in his absence, according to any practicable method that
reasonably may be adopted. Id. at 111.
See note 26 supra. Courts other than the Klim court, in applying Sniadach, have not
agreed whether or not it is based strictly on due process principles or only con-
cemed with the particular type of property involved-wages. Compare Larson v.
Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969) (applying Sniadacb to garnishment
of property other than wages) Twith Termplan Inc. v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 270,
463 P.2d 68 (1969) (refusing to extend Sniadach to property other than wages). See
also note 34 infra.
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plied to pre-judgment wage garnishment, nor was the Klim court per-
suaded by them.
Attachment in general serves a dual purpose of conferring jurisdiction
upon the court28 and preventing the perpetration of a fraud upon a
creditor. 9 General attachment is used to seize the debtor's property which
is in the debtor's possession."0 Garnishment is a special form of attach-
ment in that it detains the property of the debtor in the possession of a
third party, the garnishee." The majority of garnishment actions would
arise where the debtor is already settled within the jurisdiction of the court
as the wage earner was in Sniadach. Under these circumstances the em-
ployee-debtor is not likely to quit his job, pack up, and leave the juris-
diction in order to avoid a garnishment proceeding. Thus post-judgment
garnishment would be an effective substitute for the pre-judgment garn-
ishment of wages held unconstitutional in Sniadach.
The innkeeper's lien is another specialized form of attachment in that
the lien attaches before the innkeeper has actual possession of the guest's
property.2 The likelihood of a guest leaving without paying is a threat
to the innkeeper. If the innkeeper were required to have a hearing prior
to the seizure of a guest's goods, the guest could easily avoid the proceed-
ings by taking his property and leaving the jurisdiction before a hearing
was had but after notice of it was given. Since a guest is usually a traveler,
there is nothing to prevent his leaving quickly. By allowing the innkeeper
to take possession of a guest's property prior to notice and a hearing,
jurisdiction is conferred upon the court such that if an in personam judg-
ment is not available, an in rem judgment against the property detained
will at least partially satisfy the amount owed to the innkeeper." For these
reasons the innkeeper has a greater necessity to detain his guest's property
under the lien without a prior hearing than a creditor has to detain the
286 AM. JUR. 2d Attachment & Garnishment § 12 (1963). See Note, Attachment and
Garnis ment-Pre-judgment Garnish~nent-Study and Proposed Revisions, 9 NATuRAL
RESOURCES J. 119, 120 (1969); 22 VAND. L. REv. 1400, 1402 (1969).
29 22 VA-ND. L. REv. at 1402.
3o ld. at 1401.
31 Id. at 1402. See generally Patterson, Foreward: Wage Garnishment-An Extra-
ordinary Remedy Run Amuck, 43 WASH. L. REV. 735 (1968); Wage Garnishment in
Washington-An Empirical Study, 43 WASH. L. REV. 743 (1967).
8240 AM. JrR. 2d Hotels, Motels, etc. § 189 (1968).
38 Unless the innkeeper is allowed to detain the property of his guest, it is impossible
to guarantee either the guest's appearance in court or have a source from which to
at least partially satisfy the value of the services rendered to the guest by the innkeeper.
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property of a debtor in a prejudgment wage garnishment proceeding. The
creditor interest in the innkeeper's lien is therefore a more substantial
one. The rationale of Sniadach should be limited to the pre-judgment
garnishment of wages and not extended into the area of the innkeeper's
lien3" as it was in Klim.
The Klim court suggested payment in advance as an alternative to the
innkeeper's lien. 5 Such a measure is impractical and contrary to the
convenience sought by travelers. To make prepayment effective, one would
be required not only to pay in advance for each day he stays, but to pay
for his meals and phone calls immediately rather than "charge them to
his room.
The practical effectiveness of the innkeeper's lien lies in the innkeeper's
right thereunder to take possession of a guest's property prior to a hearing
of the case in order to prevent the guest from defrauding the innkeeper.
The Klim decision attempts to take this effectiveness away. Possession or
detention of property prior to a hearing is necessary to the effectiveness
of general attachment laws and of other possessory liens. If the applica-
tion of Sniadach is not limited to prejudgment wage garnishment," which
Klim refused to do, the effectiveness of general attachment and of pos-
sessory liens on all personal property is left in question.
M.E.B.
54The following statement of Justice Douglas in the majority opinion of Sniadach
suggests that the pre-judgment of wages has its own distinct problems which require
that it be treated differently than other general forms of attachment.
We deal here with wages-a specialized type of property presenting distinct
problems in our economic system. We turn then to the nature of that property
and probelms of procedural due process. 395 U.S. at 340.
See also note 27 supra.
35 315 F. Supp. at 124.
S
6See note 34 supra.
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